18 research outputs found
MPC for Everyone
The age of internet of things, where each device and application double up as a source of data has led to an unprecedented influx of data and analyzing this data is becoming increasingly useful. Given its sensitive nature, there is a growing demand for better and more efficient data collection and computation techniques that respect privacy. Most existing techniques for privacy-preserving computations incur large overheads, limiting platforms that can be used for performing such heavy-duty computations. Moreover, using such platforms for all computations, accumulates power with organizations that own these platforms and creates central targets of failure. This necessitates the need for distributing work and power when computing on private data.
Powerful and well-studied cryptographic notions such as secure multiparty computation (MPC) help distribute power by enabling privacy-preserving collaboration between mutually distrusting entities for complex computations on data. Unfortunately, modern MPC protocols have unaccommodating participation models. In general, parties participating in such protocols are required to perform large computations and are expected to stay active throughout the execution. However, unlike large organizations, not everyone might have the resources to carry out such large-scale and long-drawn computations. In this dissertation, our goal is to democratize such computations by designing MPC protocols that empower regular people and smaller organizations to emulate large-scale computations in a distributed manner. We make progress in two different directions.
In the first part of this dissertation, we incentivize more participation in an MPC protocol by effectively “distributing” the work amongst parties. In most known protocols, computation and communication amongst parties increases as the number of participants increase. We propose a new MPC protocol, where the per-party work decreases as the number of parties increase. As a result, when run with a large number of parties, the burden on each individual participant is significantly reduced – enabling efficient large-scale MPC computations, involving hundreds and thousands of participants. Including more participants also dilutes the power of each individual party, which is highly desirable.
In the second part of this dissertation, we introduce a new participation model called Fluid MPC. Unlike all existing protocols, where participants are required to remain online throughout the execution, in this model, one can design protocols that allow parties to leave and join the protocol execution as they wish. The minimum amount of work that a party is required to do in order to participate is extremely small in comparison to the size of the entire computation. This extreme flexibility allows parties – including those with low resources and limited time – to contribute according to their computational capacity and effectively yields a weighted, privacy-preserving, distributed computing system
Breaking the -Bit Barrier: Byzantine Agreement with Polylog Bits Per Party
Byzantine agreement (BA), the task of parties to agree on one of their
input bits in the face of malicious agents, is a powerful primitive that lies
at the core of a vast range of distributed protocols. Interestingly, in
protocols with the best overall communication, the demands of the parties are
highly unbalanced: the amortized cost is bits per party, but some
parties must send bits. In best known balanced protocols, the
overall communication is sub-optimal, with each party communicating . In this work, we ask whether asymmetry is inherent for optimizing
total communication. Our contributions in this line are as follows:
1) We define a cryptographic primitive, succinctly reconstructed distributed
signatures (SRDS), that suffices for constructing balanced BA. We
provide two constructions of SRDS from different cryptographic and Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI) assumptions.
2) The SRDS-based BA follows a paradigm of boosting from "almost-everywhere"
agreement to full agreement, and does so in a single round. We prove that PKI
setup and cryptographic assumptions are necessary for such protocols in which
every party sends messages.
3) We further explore connections between a natural approach toward attaining
SRDS and average-case succinct non-interactive argument systems (SNARGs) for a
particular type of NP-Complete problems (generalizing Subset-Sum and
Subset-Product).
Our results provide new approaches forward, as well as limitations and
barriers, towards minimizing per-party communication of BA. In particular, we
construct the first two BA protocols with balanced communication,
offering a tradeoff between setup and cryptographic assumptions, and answering
an open question presented by King and Saia (DISC'09)
On Actively-Secure Elementary MPC Reductions
We introduce the notion of \emph{elementary MPC} reductions that allow us to securely compute a functionality by making a single call to a constant-degree ``non-cryptographic\u27\u27 functionality without requiring any additional interaction. Roughly speaking, ``non-cryptographic\u27\u27 means that does not make use of cryptographic primitives, though the parties can locally call such primitives.
Classical MPC results yield such elementary reductions in various cases including the setting of passive security with full corruption threshold (Yao, FOCS\u2786; Beaver, Micali, and Rogaway, STOC\u2790), the setting of full active security against a corrupted minority (Damgård and Ishai, Crypto\u2705), and, for NC1 functionalities, even for the setting of full active (information-theoretic) security with full corruption threshold of (Ishai and Kushilevitz, FOCS\u2700). This leaves open the existence of an elementary reduction that achieves full active security in the dishonest majority setting for all efficiently computable functions.
Our main result shows that such a reduction is unlikely to exist. Specifically, the existence of a computationally secure elementary reduction that makes black-box use of a PRG and achieves a very weak form of partial fairness (e.g., that holds only when the first party is not corrupted) would allow us to realize any efficiently-computable function by a \emph{constant-round} protocol that achieves a non-trivial notion of information-theoretic passive security. The existence of the latter is a well-known 3-decade old open problem in information-theoretic cryptography (Beaver, Micali, and Rogaway, STOC\u2790).
On the positive side, we observe that this barrier can be bypassed under any of the following relaxations: (1) non-black-box use of a pseudorandom generator; (2) weaker security guarantees such as security with identifiable abort; or (3) an additional round of communication with the functionality
How to Prove Statements Obliviously?
Cryptographic applications often require proving statements about hidden secrets satisfying certain circuit relations. Moreover, these proofs must often be generated obliviously, i.e., without knowledge of the secret. This work presents a new technique called --- FRI on hidden values --- for efficiently proving such statements.
This technique enables a polynomial commitment scheme for values hidden inside linearly homomorphic primitives, such as linearly homomorphic encryption, linearly homomorphic commitment, group exponentiation, fully homomorphic encryption, etc.
Building on this technique, we obtain the following results.
1. An efficient SNARK for proving the honest evaluation of FHE ciphertexts. This allows for an efficiently verifiable private delegation of computation, where the client only needs to perform logarithmic many FHE computations to verify the correctness of the computation.
2. An efficient approach for privately delegating the computation of zkSNARKs to a single untrusted server, without making any non-black-box use of cryptography. All prior works require multiple servers and the assumption that some subset of the servers are honest.
3. A weighted threshold signature scheme that does not require any setup. In particular, parties may sample their own keys independently, and no distributed key generation (DKG) protocol is needed. Furthermore, the efficiency of our scheme is completely independent of the weights.
Prior to this work, there were no known black-box feasibility results for any of these applications. We also investigate the use of this approach in the context of public proof aggregation. These are only a few representative applications that we explore in this paper. We expect our techniques to be widely applicable in many other scenarios
Dora: Processor Expressiveness is (Nearly) Free in Zero-Knowledge for RAM Programs
Existing protocols for proving the correct execution of a RAM program in zero-knowledge are plagued by a processor expressiveness trade-off : supporting fewer instructions results in smaller processor circuits (which improves performance), but may result in more program execution steps because non-supported instruction must be emulated over multiple processor steps (which diminishes performance).
We present Dora, a concretely efficient zero-knowledge protocol for RAM programs that sidesteps this tension by making it (nearly) free to add additional instructions to the processor. The computational and communication complexity of proving each step of a computation in Dora, is constant in the number of supported instructions. Dora is also highly generic and only assumes the existence of linearly homomorphic commitments. We implement Dora and demonstrate that on commodity hardware it can prove the correct execution of a processor with thousands of instruction, each of which has thousands of gates, in just a few milliseconds per step
Towards Efficiency-Preserving Round Compression in MPC: Do fewer rounds mean more computation?
Reducing the rounds of interaction in secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols has been the topic of study of many works. One popular approach to reduce rounds is to construct *round compression compilers*. A round compression compiler is one that takes a highly interactive protocol and transforms it into a protocol with far fewer rounds. The design of round compression compilers has traditionally focused on preserving the security properties of the underlying protocol and in particular, not much attention has been given towards preserving their computational and communication efficiency. Indeed, the recent round compression compilers that yield round-optimal MPC protocols incur large computational and communication overhead.
In this work, we initiate the study of *efficiency-preserving* round compression compilers, i.e. compilers that translate the efficiency benefits of the underlying highly interactive protocols to the fewer round setting. Focusing on the honest majority setting (with near-optimal corruption threshold , for any ), we devise a new compiler that yields two round (i.e., round optimal) semi-honest MPC with similar communication efficiency as the underlying (arbitrary round) protocol. By applying our compiler on the most efficient known MPC protocols, we obtain a two-round semi-honest protocol based on one-way functions, with total communication (and per-party computation) cost -- a significant improvement over prior two-round protocols with cost , where , is the size of the circuit computing the function and the corresponding depth. Our result can also be extended to handle malicious adversaries, either using stronger assumptions in the public key infrastructure (PKI) model, or in the plain model using an extra round.
An artifact of our approach is that the resultant protocol is ``unbalanced\u27\u27 in the amount of computation performed by different parties. We give evidence that this is *necessary* in our setting. Our impossibility result makes novel use of the ``MPC-in-the-head paradigm which has typically been used to demonstrate feasibility results
Maximally-Fluid MPC with Guaranteed Output Delivery
To overcome the limitations of traditional secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols that consider a static set of participants, in a recent work, Choudhuri et al. [CRYPTO 2021] introduced a new model called Fluid MPC, which supports {\em dynamic} participants. Protocols in this model allow parties to join and leave the computation as they wish. Unfortunately, known fluid MPC protocols (even with strong honest-majority), either only achieve security with abort, or require strong computational and trusted setup assumptions.
In this work, we also consider the hardest setting --- called the maximally-fluid model --- where each party can leave the computation after participating in a single round. We study the problem of designing maximally-fluid MPC protocols that achieve security with {guaranteed output delivery}, and obtain the following main results:
1. We design a perfectly secure maximally-fluid MPC protocol, that achieves guaranteed output delivery against unbounded adversaries who are allowed to corrupt less than a third of the parties in every round/committee.
2. For the case where the adversary is allowed to corrupt up to half of the parties in each committee, we present a new computationally secure maximally-fluid MPC protocol with guaranteed output delivery. Unlike prior works that require correlated setup and NIZKs, our construction only uses a common random string setup and is based on linearly-homomorphic equivocal commitments
Speed-Stacking: Fast Sublinear Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Disjunctions
Building on recent disjunctive compilers for zero-knowledge (e.g. Goel et al. [EUROCRYPT\u2722]) we propose a new compiler that, when applied to sublinear-sized proofs, can result in sublinear-size disjunctive zero-knowledge with sublinear proving times (without meaningfully increasing proof sizes). Our key observation is that simulation in sublinear-size zero-knowledge proof systems can be much faster (both concretely and asymptotically) than the honest prover. We study applying our compiler to two classes of -round protocols: interactive oracle proofs, specifically Aurora [EUROCRYPT\u2719] and Fractal [EUROCRYPT\u2720], and folding arguments, specifically Compressed -protocols [CRYPTO\u2720, CRYPTO\u2721] and Bulletproofs [S&P\u2718]. This study validates that the compiler can lead to significant savings. For example, applying our compiler to Fractal enables us to prove a disjunction of clauses, each of size , with only computation, versus when proving the disjunction directly. We also find that our compiler offers a new lens through which to understand zero-knowledge proofs, evidenced by multiple examples of protocols with the same standalone complexity that each behave very differently when stacked
Efficient Set Membership Proofs using MPC-in-the-Head
Set membership proofs are an invaluable part of privacy preserving systems. These proofs allow a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a witness corresponding to a secret element of a public set, such that they jointly satisfy a given NP relation, {\em i.e.} and is a member of a public set . This allows the identity of the prover to remain hidden, eg. ring signatures and confidential transactions in cryptocurrencies.
In this work, we develop a new technique for efficiently adding logarithmic-sized set membership proofs to any MPC-in-the-head based zero-knowledge protocol (Ishai et al. [STOC\u2707]). We integrate our technique into an open source implementation of the state-of-the-art, post quantum secure zero-knowledge protocol of Katz et al. [CCS\u2718]. We find that using our techniques to construct ring signatures results in signatures (based only on symmetric key primitives) that are between 5 and 10 times smaller than state-of-the-art techniques based on the same assumptions. We also show that our techniques can be used to efficiently construct post-quantum secure RingCT from only symmetric key primitives
Round-Optimal Secure Multiparty Computation with Honest Majority
We study the exact round complexity of secure multiparty computation (MPC) in the honest majority setting. We construct several round-optimal -party protocols, tolerating any corruptions.
- Security with abort: We give the first construction of two round MPC for general functions that achieves security with abort against malicious adversaries in the plain model. The security of our protocol only relies on one-way functions.
- Guaranteed output delivery: We also construct protocols that achieve security with guaranteed output delivery: (i) Against fail-stop adversaries, we construct two round MPC either in the (bare) public-key infrastructure model with no additional assumptions, or in the plain model assuming two-round semi-honest oblivious transfer. In three rounds, however, we can achieve security assuming only one-way functions. (ii) Against malicious adversaries, we construct three round MPC in the plain model, assuming public-key encryption and Zaps. Previously, such protocols were only known based on specific learning assumptions and required the use of common reference strings.
All of our results are obtained via general compilers that may be of independent interest